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Summary Judgment: Is It A Lawyer's Shortcut?
Summary judgment is a judgment or decree by a court in a case pend-
ing before it when as a matter of law the proceedings show that there is no
issue to be resolved between the litigants. The purpose of the remedy
is to relieve litigants and courts of the expense and delay of a jury trial
on an unnecessary suit when a party is unable to support by competent
evidence any material issue of fact. As long as all material facts are
admitted, and a party is unable to support a fact contention by any
sufficient evidence which might raise an issue, a summary judgment can
be used successfully in order to avoid the expense and delays which accom-
pany a trial.
The problem facing the courts in the administration of the rule is
generally that of determining whether or not there is any genuine issue as
to any material fact. If such an issue exists, the party opposing the
motion is entitled to a full trial with all the common law safeguards.
Thus, the courts are confronted with two opposing policies. On the
one hand, if there be no issue of fact in the case, a judgment on summary
proceedings must be given in order to secure a speedy effectuation of
rights. On the other hand, neither party should be foreclosed if there are
real issues to be tried, for in the absence of a full hearing, injustice may
result.
By examining the nature of summary judgment proceedings, the
aspect of its administration and correlative inequities will be self-evident.
One may readily observe the great burden which the courts place on the
moving party to establish his case to such a high degree of probability
that the judge will be convinced that a trial would be a useless formality.
On the other hand, the burden on the opponent is much simpler. He need
do nothing unless the movant has met his burden of producing evidence
sufficient to indicate that a trial is unnecessary. If the movant does arrive
at this position, the opponent may then rely upon persuasion to establish
that doubt remains as to the existence of a triable issue.
It appears that the party moving for summary judgment has a greater
burden than simply establishing his claim or defense by showing that no
factual issue exists. The implication is that he has the burden of estab-
lishing that his opponent has no case.
Many courts throughout the United States have been zealous in pro-
tecting the defendant from any injustice that might result from summary
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dispositions. Permitting the defendant to defeat the motion with little
more than a pleading is questionable practice, since the plaintiff has a right
to a prompt effectuation when there is no fact issue involved in the case,
and since the presence of a fact issue can be determined, in many cases,
only by compelling the defendant to make a disclosure of his evidence.
On the other hand, the courts have not been nearly as solicitous where
plaintiffs are concerned. There is a danger that in certain cases when the
plaintiff relies on evidence drawn from the defendant, the requirement of
producing evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case will defeat
the plaintiff unjustly.
Prevailing View--Florida as an Example
It must be emphasized that summary judgment is not a substitute for
a trial. Thus, on a motion for summary judgment the judge should not
decide any factual questions. He should decide the case purely on the
strength of the legal questions raised. "Summary judgment applies only
in cases where the pleadings, interrogatories, depositions, and other ad-
missions on file show that there is no controversy between the parties in
regard to the basic facts of the case."' The judge then has the authority
to decide the questions of law without waiting for the trial. Should
there be any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of a material fact,
such doubt must be resolved against the movant.2
In negligence proceedings, courts infrequently uphold a motion by
the plaintiff for summary judgment. With such questions as probable
cause, or whether the defendant acted negligently as evidence from the
facts of the case, a summary judgment is normally precluded. In certain
jurisdictions, issues of negligence are considered not susceptible to sum-
mary adjudication and may be granted only where the facts are not
only undisputed but are such that all reasonable men in exercise of fair
and impartial judgment must draw inference and conclusion therefrom of
non-negligence. To say the least, courts are extremely careful in granting
a summary judgment in negligence cases. However, should there be no
trace or scintilla of a genuine issue presented by the litigants, a summary
judgment may be granted in negligence cases as evidenced by a Wisconsin
case.3 In this instance, the time and expense of a trial were eliminated
'Richmond v. Florida Power and Light Co., 58 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1952).' Quinn v. Helmy Furniture Co., 141 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1962).
Bohlmann v. Penn Electric Corp., 232 Wisc. 232, 286 N.W. 552 (1939).
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The judge did not decide any factual questions. He merely decided the
case on the strength of the legal questions raised.
In addition to negligence proceedings, summary judgments are nor-
mally not applied to cases involving fraud or probate matters. However,
a stronger rationale for the penchant of most courts to look skeptically
at a motion for summary judgment is admittedly found in certain cases.
In cases involving fraud, there must necessarily be a full explanation
of the facts and circumstances of the alleged wrong in order to determine
if they collectively constitute a fraud. This can seldom be done without
a trial.4 According to Alepgo Corp. v. Pozin, summary judgment must be
cautiously granted in cases of fraud due to the fact that all evidence
in summary judgment must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
adverse party. In fraud proceedings, conflict usually appears if the
plaintiff must admit every conclusion or inference favorable to the party
against whom the motion is made and which might reasonably be in-
ferred.5
Although the plaintiff may be awarded a summary judgment when
the evidence adduced in support of his claim consists of undisputed docu-
mentary evidence, injustice may result when the plaintiff, as moving party,
substantiates his case by testimonial evidence. Generally speaking, the
defendant need make only such a showing at the hearing of the motion
for summary judgment as will raise a suspicion that an issue of fact
exists. Such a misgiving may be raised by persuading the court that
conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or that the credi-
bility of the plaintiff's witnesses is questionable, or by producing contro-
verting evidence. Such a judicial trend is not only disheartening to a
plaintiff, but at times quite inequitable.
Finally, any test or standard, no matter how exact in statement, is
applied by a judge, in the exercise of his discretion, and since this is a
matter of human judgment, precision is impossible. Thus, success in
making a correct compromise between the burden on plaintiffs and the
quest for justice to the defendants must be measured with impartiality,
exactitude, and a great sense of delicacy.
Admittedly, the intention of a motion for summary judgment is to
avoid the time, labor and expense to counsel, parties, court and jury of
an unnecessary trial. A summary judgment proceeding is not a trial of
'Alepgo Corp. v. Pozin, 114 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1959).
' Id., p. 646.
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issues, but instead is a determination whether there are issues to be tried.
Certainly, the remedy is not available to adjudicate cases by a short-cut
method, and it cannot be employed unless the court perceives clearly and
has no doubt that a trial in the familiar sense of the word would be un-
availing, and that a directed verdict for the movant would result if a
trial were had. Yet, when there is nothing in fact to be adjudicated the
applicable procedure to be employed by counsel and accepted by the court
is a motion for summary judgment.
Racial Discrimination in the Creation of Charitable Trust
One of the most important and current issues concerning the law
of trusts is racial discrimination in the creation of a charitable trust.
The problem is more acute if the court upholds the validity of a trust
which is created for the purpose of racial discrimination.
On May 20, 1968, one case involving this problem finally came to an
end, when the United States Supreme Court opened the doors of Girard
College, located in the city of Philadelphia, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, to qualified orphan boys of all races. By denying certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the United States
Supreme Court has ended a fourteen year battle in the federal courts
involving racial discrimination in the admittance of Negroes to Girard
College.'
This problem, to be understood thoroughly, must be studied through
its various stages. It first came to light in 1844 in the case of Vidal v.
Girard's Ex'rs.2 The facts are stated below:
Stephen Girard created a trust for the establishment of Girard Col-
lege, in the city of Philadelphia, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The
trust stated that the money should be used by the City of Philadelphia for
the purpose of erecting and operating a school for poor, white male
orphans. The next of kin objected to the trust for two reasons: First,
because of the exclusion of all ecclesiatics, missionaries, and ministers of
any sect, from holding or exercising any station or duty in the college.
Second, because it limits the instruction to be given the scholars thereby
excluding, by implication, all instruction in the Christian religion.3 The
1 Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 392 F.2d 120 (1968).
' Vidal et al. v. Girard's Executors, 12 Howard 126 (1844).
'Id., p. 128.
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